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I. Introduction
Implementing development policies focused on improving child welfare can be expensive, time consuming, and, sometimes, ineffective (Filmer 2003 , Glewwe and Kremer 2006 , Ingram and Kessides 1994 . This is particularly true if the intervention is country-wide and focused on major activities like building infrastructure, purchasing supplies, or developing advocacy groups (Ingram and Kessides 1994) . Can alternative policy paths like changes to family law lead to major advancements in child welfare and, eventually, economic development? To study this, one needs a rarefied environment where a national policy is implemented with enough leverage to induce a redistribution of household resources in certain households, restrict the household's ability to manipulate the magnitude or speed of the redistribution, and data overtime of those exposed and not exposed to the policy to estimate outcomes. I find a natural experiment environment close to this in Chile where gendered family norms are relatively rigid, geographic immobility is common, family legal procedures are tied to the local geography where one lives and local family court districts are independent, and a major policy shock -the legalization of divorce -happened in 2004.
After almost a decade of intense national debate, the Chilean Congress passed a revised Civil Marriage Act in 2004. For the first time in the country's history, Chileans could divorce. The Act, progressive in nature, included a requirement that 3 breadwinners (mostly men) provide an economic compensation 2 to homemakers (almost always women) equivalent to lost wages incurred while engaging in home production during the marriage. Prior research shows that shifting resources to homemakers increases their bargaining power within marriage (Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1996 , Voena 2015 , Wong 2016 , and evidence exists that, on average, women invest more in household goods, such as children's education and clothing, than men (Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1996 , Quisumbing and Maluccio 1999 , Rubalcava et al. 2004 , Rangel 2006 , Schady and Rosero 2007 , Nunley and Seals 2011 . Additionally, Chilean social networks and family structures are such that "…men [within the household] exercise overt and subtle forms of control over family monetary allocation, spending choices and earnings strategies (Stillerman 2004 )." A shift in resources away from men into the hands of women could change household consumption and investment patterns towards woman's preferences.
In this paper, I study the impact of two changes: the introduction of divorce with economic compensation and exogenous variation in geographically local wait times to finalize a divorce 3 . To shed light on the question of whether family policies in middle income countries can accelerate development, I explore school enrollment under the new family law regime. I build on an already existing trove of literature on the effects of divorce and expand it by demonstrating that both the advancement of policies that shift property rights to family members who invest in household goods like children's education and the bureaucratic idiosyncrasies involved in implementing said policy, influence household bargaining and can accelerate or deter economic development. I use a natural experiment in exogenous variation of family court's average length of time to divorce to study this phenomenon.
2 The economic compensation was paid as a cash lump sum or in regular installments until paid in full. Some breadwinners converted the lump sum cash payment into a property transfer (e.g. rights to full ownership of the family house) (Cox 2011) . 3 Individuals could not manipulate their environment to invoke shorter wait times, described in more detail later in the paper.
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II. Background
A. Household Bargaining Models, Family Law, and Child Outcomes
Unitary models assume a household maximizes a single, well defined utility function subject to a household budget constraint where preferences are decided by consensus among household members or determined by a benevolent dictator (Samuelson 1956 , Becker 1981 . In the late 20th century, economists dissatisfied with the unitary model's simplicity began developing models in which household members bargained over consumption decisions based on the resources they controlled or the separate spheres they occupied (Manser and Brown 1980 , McElroy and Horney 1981 , Lundberg & Pollak 1993 and this brought about a groundswell of literature advancing the notion that the unitary model of household utility does not accurately describe household economic behavior (Lundberg & Pollak 1994 , Lundberg & Pollak 1995 , Alderman et al. 1995 , Behrman 1997 , Bergstrom 1997 , Gray 1998 , Chiappori et al. 2002 , Ermisch 2003 . Empirical studies have, for the most part, provided evidence in support of cooperative bargaining models (Schultz 1990 , Thomas 1990 , Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1996 , Fortin and Lacroix 1997 , Browning and Chiappori 1998 , Rangel 2006 , and, by now, enough evidence has accumulated demonstrating that household consumption differs depending on who is making the decision and who controls the resources.
The impact of divorce laws on divorce rates and marital instability has been a topic studied extensively within the U.S. Gray (1998) found the expansion to unilateral divorce in the 1970s and related reassignment of property rights within marriage did not affect divorce rates, arguing that instead within household transfers may have taken place to prevent increased marital dissolution. Gruber (2004) , on the other hand, used four decades of decennial data to show that 5 unilateral divorce increased the incident of divorce, and Wolfers (2006) showed that while divorce rates rose in the short run in response to unilateral divorce laws, the rise dissipated overtime. He found that changes in family law explain little of the rise in divorce in the U.S. during the late 20 th century. In a slightly different study, Wong (2016) used state variation in U.S. "homemaking" provisions of the 1980s to show that reinforcement of wives' post-divorce property rights increased her bargaining power and, subsequently increased marriages. While the overall impact of divorce law on marital instability is relevant, in this study I focus instead on household bargaining among married couples within the context of a shift in outside options due to the legalization of divorce in Chile and not on changes to the incidence of divorce.
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Most research on household bargaining models within the context of divorce tests the changing responsiveness of female labor supply to changes in family law,
showing mixed results. All else equal, Fernández and Wong (2014) found increasing divorce risk associated with married couples investing less in joint household savings and wives working more. Bargain et al. (2012) examined the effect of legalizing divorce in Ireland in 1996 and found, compared to U.S. studies, a larger magnitude increase in female labor supply attributable to divorce. They argue that the larger magnitude is driven by differences between expanding already existing laws compared to creating a divorce law where none previously existed.
While Gray (1998) found no evidence on divorce rates, he did find evidence consistent with a standard household bargaining model where women's labor force participation and leisure time increased as a function of increasing bargaining power. Gray's study is particularly relevant because he examined the expansion of 4 The reasons for this are twofold: not enough time had passed post the introduction of divorce in my data to analyze an impact on divorce rates, and, since there was no divorce prior to the legalization of divorce, during the first years of after the implementation of divorce not many families divorced. The sample of divorced adults is small in the immediate years following its legalization.
6 divorce within the context of varying degrees of property laws that reallocated or redistributed resources upon divorce. He highlighted an important policy implication for this study, which is that "…any divorce-law change that alters the financial well-being of divorcing women and their children will also impact the welfare of individuals in families that do not dissolve…these indirect effects should not be ignored when designing effective social and economic policies (p. 639)." Stevenson (2007) also found that unilateral divorce induced spouses to invest less in marriage-specific capital like home production and showed an increase in wives'
labor force participation and decrease in fertility. Findings on fertility, however, can be difficult to interpret. Divorce reform in China reduced the likelihood of having a son after a firstborn child, attributable to an increase in women's empowerment within marriage due to improved outside options (Sun and Zhao 2016) . The introduction of Chile's divorce law decreased the age at first birth for highly educated women (Gallegos and Ondrich 2017) . While this might seem contradictory, the authors argued that highly education women had the most to gain from economic compensation within the new divorce law. High-skilled married women post-divorce law had less to lose from leaving the labor market since their home production could be compensated for upon divorce.
The responsiveness of labor supply has been shown particularly sensitive for mothers (Nunley and Seals 2011, Genadek et al. 2007 ). Nunley and Seals found that the expansion of joint custody laws in the U.S. transferring bargaining power away from married mothers increased female labor supply. Genadek et al. found the labor supply of mothers more responsive to no-fault divorce and property division rules in the U.S. than for married women without children.
While there is a rich literature on divorce rates and the effect of divorce on female labor supply and fertility, less is known about what other impacts family law has on intrahousehold bargaining of other household outcomes important to economic development, such as health, education, and child welfare. While there is evidence 7 that easier access to divorce decreases female suicide, domestic violence, and possibly female homicides (Stevenson and Wolfers 2006) , easier access to divorce has also been shown to increase the odds of adult suicide of the children of divorced parents (Gruber 2004) .
Child health and education are future household investments in the form of informal social security for both parents in old age. Gruber (2004) Generally ranging from one to nine comunas per family court district; the average was three or four. An exception was the capital city of Santiago, in which one family court district encompassed 19 comunas and where 10 diverse family court systems existed.
All cases related to family legal issues, including cases of inheritance, domestic violence, child custody, adoptions, paternity cases, abandonment, child neglect and abuse, juvenile delinquency, and adjudication cases were transferred to the family courts upon creation. Divorce cases were submitted and finalized within the new family court system; they were a minority of all cases. The independent creation of each court and their administrative management procedures and protocols for handling cases, in addition to the diversity and magnitude of caseloads within each court, independence and working speed of judges, and general management methods employed by the court administrator and his/her staff all influenced wait time for finalizing a divorce.
Geographic Constraints.-Chileans rarely move far from their nuclear family and usually marry and start a family in the same township or neighborhood where they themselves were raised. Araos- Bralic (2015) found through ethnographic studies in Chile that both members from poor and well-off families live in close geographic proximity to their descendant groups (of at least three-generations), a phenomenon locally called "allegamiento." The Chilean divorce law stipulated that when couples decided to divorce, they could only divorce in the family court critical to this study because it restricts the ability of individuals to manipulate the length of time to divorce. 13 average, the magnitude of differences between then on most indicators is modest.
Cohabiting couples are slightly younger. Cohabiting women have a somewhat closer attachment to the labor market (on the extensive margin) but work less hours per week than married mothers (intensive margin). Cohabiters appear to earn less and have lower education. That said, both family types have around the same number of children (two). Fathers are rarely homemaker, almost always breadwinners, and strongly attached to the labor market -were they appear to work a lot (50 hours per week).
III. Data
A. Encuesta de Protección Social (EPS)
I use panel data from the Chilean Encuesta de Protección Social 14 (EPS) combined with administrative records on divorce from the Chilean Supreme Court.
The EPS data used in this study come from three waves of the survey ( A subset of school age children (ages 6 to 18) whose parents were married or cohabitating over the sample time period is constructed for the main analysis.
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Since the estimates reported are calculated using a method that differences over time and across groups, any unobserved heterogeneity stable over time and between 15 I follow a similar methodology to Martínez (2013) 15 children from married and cohabiting parents is differenced out and will not bias the observed estimates. The final sample includes 14,362 children from married parent families and 2,744 children from cohabiting parents ( Table 2) .
B. Administrative Records on Divorce
In partnership with the University of Chile's Center for Microdata, we acquired administrative records on divorce through a special request to the Chilean Supreme Court. Electronic records on divorce cases were only available for urban areas.
Therefore, any analysis using length of time to finalizing a divorce was limited to children living in urban areas, around 70 percent in the sample ( Table 2) If divorce shifts the opportunity cost of remaining married, it does so only in the sense that the threat of divorce or costs associated with divorce are truly credible.
Shorter wait times make the threat of divorce more imminent and, thereby, more credible. If true, lengthy wait times should decrease the opportunity costs for homemakers and increase them for breadwinners resulting in less bargaining power for the homemaker in married couple households. Credibility, in this case, is measured by the time distance between when a homemaker threatens divorce and when the divorce can be actualized. The shorter the distance is, the more credible the threat. Take two extreme examples. In one, a homemaker threatens a divorce from his/her spouse and the divorce can be finalized in court the following day and economic compensation will be due immediately. The breadwinner will see the threat as very credible because a financial fine would be imposed the next day and will adjust accordingly by yielding to the demands of the homemaker's stated preferences.
If, however, the homemaker threatens divorce but finalizing the divorce will take more than one year, the breadwinner will see the immediate threat as less credible.
The breadwinner could, for example, ask the homemaker to leave the home the next day, but the economic compensation would be due far into the future -once the divorce was finalized. In the meantime, the homemaker would need to find alternative living arrangements and, even if he/she is able to find resources for housing or alternative living arrangements with family or friends, a lot can happen in one year. Perhaps the breadwinner believes the short term separation and lack of resources will bring the homemaker back to the home before the divorce is 
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Housewives have strong local social networks. When they get together for family or social events, generally husbands tag along. Wives tend to socialize in one group (e.g. around food preparation in the kitchen), while husbands tend to socialize in a separate group (e.g. around a grill or outside smoking). Gossip travels and, if a family member or close friend in the local comuna is getting a divorce, people will hear about it in social gatherings or while meeting one-on-one with friends and family. They will also hear details related to the divorce. Was it messy? Was it quick? Did it take a long time? Who got the house? What about child support?
All of this information travels through the social network, and, since Chileans are not commonly mobile, information about the process, ease, and length of time to divorce will travel within their comuna. Those in unstable or unhappy marriages are likely to hear this information or search it out and use it to update their priors on the opportunity costs associated with staying in their marriage. Those in unhappy marriages may also seek out advice from lawyers, family court staff, public servants, and others who would be knowledgeable about wait times and would share this information along with information about the requirements and process for divorce.
B. Difference-in-Difference Estimation
A difference-in-differences (DD) approach with panel data can generate unbiased estimates of the impact of a policy by comparing over time the group that experienced the policy change (treatment) to a similar group that did not (control).
In this case, children from married parent families are the treatment group since they are directly exposed to and potentially affected by the legalization of divorce after 2004. Children from cohabiting parent families are the control group because these intact two-parent family households are not eligible for economic group under the parallel trends assumption.
Assuming the control group is valid for now, the basic individual-level equation
in the DD analysis is the following.
(1)
where Sigt is the binary dependent variable indicating whether child i from group g at time t is in school, Mg is a dichotomous variable that equals one for children from In general, this basic DD equation is sufficient to produce unbiased estimates of the coefficient of interest, 5 . However, if decisions regarding education are made 17 A similar method of selecting treatment and control groups to understand the impact of changes in family law has also been employed by Rangel (2006) and Martínez (2013) . Although in both cases, Rangel and Martínez use children from cohabiting parent families as the treated because they are interested in the impact of alimony rights and child support expansions to cohabiting couples with children.
20 differently for subgroups within the sample and the decision-making process is correlated with explanatory variables not included in the regression equation, omitted variable bias can occur. In the case of school enrollment, the parental decision-making process may be different based on the gender and age of the child.
For this reason, two approaches are considered. First, I add controls for gender and age of the child to Equation (1). Adding these variables is expected to improve the estimation since, for example, parental decisions to enroll their children in primary school are different from decisions to enroll them in secondary or tertiary school.
Parents might also have different preferences in terms of schooling for daughters compared to sons (Gertler and Glewwe 1992, Rubalcava and Contreras 2000) .
Rubalcava and Contreras find evidence in Chile of gender preferences in children's education. Adding these controls gives the following equation.
(2)
where Zigt are the gender and age specific control variables. All other variables are the same as in Equation (1).
C. Modeling Wait Times
For wait times to be a valid exogenous source of variation, individuals should not be able to manipulate wait times with their own behavior. Aside from the fact that married individuals cannot manipulate or change the comuna they divorce in 18 , I also motivate this argument by examining other potential factors that influence wait times, dividing them into three major categories: overall family court case volume, 18 Recall the law requires individuals to divorce in the family court district corresponding to the comuna in which they reside.
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propensity for divorce cases, and environmental characteristics. The model is shown in Equation (3). 
D. Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD) Estimation
To capture the effect of bureaucratic processes on intrahousehold bargaining, I
use the average wait time to divorce by comuna. Adding wait time with the appropriate interaction terms to Equation (2) generates a difference-in-differencein-difference (DDD) estimation as shown in Equation (4).
(4)
where 3 is the wait time for divorce by court district in the last time period. All other variables are labeled as in Equations (1) Given the above, the final reduced form DDD equation I estimate is:
The coefficients of interest in Equation (5) If 4 is significant, it could be an anticipation effect related to the law change.
E. Regression Models
Since the binary dependent variable, children's school enrollment, is a variable indicating one if the child is in school and zero otherwise, all estimation equations are estimated using a linear probability model (LPM), logit, and probit. For ease of interpretation, the LPM model results are discussed. Logit and probit models are shown to produce similar results in both direction and significance. I conducted a Bruesch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for random effects (results not shown) and found that random effects are appropriate.
19 Using random effects in my analysis allows for individual effects, and I use Huber-White robust standard errors for heteroscedasticity in all regressions.
V. Results
A. Validating the Parallel Trend Assumption
A key non-trivial identifying assumption with DD estimation is that the trend in outcomes of interest must be similar for both treatment and control groups preintervention (Angrist and Pischke 2009) . To test this assumption, I report schooling trends for two time periods before the intervention. If the parallel assumption holds prior to the treatment, then the two groups can be compared using difference-indifferences estimation. Table 3 shows the results from difference-in-difference (DD) estimations of linear probability model, logit, and probit equations. 20 Column (1) represents Equation (1) gender. Adding these variables improves the estimation (Column (2) in Table 3 ).
B. The Effect of Access to Divorce Law on Schooling
Once age 21 and gender are controlled for, the impact of exposure to divorce, ̂5 , is larger, 3.3 percentage points, and significant at p = 0.001. All else equal, school enrollment for girls increased by almost one percentage point (0.8) compared to boys. Notes: Linear Probability Model (LPM) using a national sample. Random effects and Huber-White robust standard errors; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
21 Dummy variables are used for age since the sample is not representative of the total population with its related underlying functional form. 30 are run using the subset of urban children. Table 5 presents the comparison results for urban children in Columns (1) and (2). Notice the results for the urban sample are similar to the national sample showing a positive (3.4 percentage points) and significant effect of access to divorce on children's education in urban areas. The DDD analysis of Equation (4) in its reduced form (Equation (5)) is presented in Table 5 Column (3). Administrative wait time, ̂5 , is negative and significant (p = 0.070). Every six-month increase in wait time to finalize a divorce results in an approximate one percentage point (0.9) decrease in school enrollment. The coefficient measuring the overall effect of access to divorce, ̂5 , increases to 5.5 Logit and probit models for the urban sample provide similar results; however, the coefficients themselves do not directly explain the estimated effect of each independent variable. For that reason, the marginal effects of the national sample and urban sample logit regressions are presented in Table 6 , comparing children of Table 2 gives clear indication that including dummy variables for age and running separate regressions by school type are appropriate steps in the estimation process.
Although access to divorce for parents had a positive effect on children's education, interpreted as increasing women's bargaining power within married couple families, age was also significant. All else equal, older children were less likely to attend school compared to six year olds (results not shown). A question still remains as to which school age children benefitted the most from the implementation and speed of divorce. For that reason, and because it is possible that enrollment decisions are made differently depending on the level of school (primary versus secondary), the LPM regressions are replicated separately for elementary school-aged and secondary school-aged children for both the national and urban samples (Table 7) . of encouraging elder children to work for pay in lieu of continued schooling. This theory is somewhat supported by the slightly higher impact of the law in urban areas, as the magnitude of the effect is larger for the urban sample compared to the national sample as a whole (Table 7) . Financial constraints and decisions between school and working in, for example, the service sector as a teen, might be more salient in higher population density urban areas where paid or informal work to support the family business is more easily available to teenagers in middle income countries.
VI. Conclusion
Attempts to analyze the effects of divorce on child and family wellbeing are challenging due to selection bias and endogeneity issues. I take advantage of a unique natural experiment to advance our understanding of the role family policies play in economic development. In Chile, a society comprised of strong gendered family norms (Stillerman 2004) , access to divorce with economic compensation shifted household bargaining power into the hands of married women. Legal constraints regarding where individuals could divorce, along with the expansion of new independent family court districts, provided a ripe context for a natural experiment where I use exogenous wait times for divorce to study not only the effect of access to divorce with strong property right redistribution, but also relevance of administrative processes in hindering or facilitating economic development.
In a middle income, largely Catholic country, introducing a path to legal divorce induced changes in household bargaining that lead to improvements in child welfare, advancing economic development, by inducing higher investments in children's education. In particular, children in secondary school increased school enrollment between 5.1 and 9.0 percentage points. Second, when the threat of divorce was less imminent (defined by lagged processing times), investments in children's education decreased by 1.7 percentage points every six months for secondary school-aged children. These results are larger in magnitude than those found by Rangel (2006) and Martínez (2013) . However, given that the policy change was (1) more drastic (from no divorce to a progressive divorce law requiring the back pay of wages to homemakers), (2) 
APPENDIX -ALTERNATIVE CONTROL GROUPS
There are two other potential comparison groups as counterfactuals, or controls, for this analysis: single, never-married and annulled/divorced parent families.
Neither of these groups would be eligible for divorce and its economic compensation package. These two groups are less similar to married-parent families than cohabiting families for many reasons including the number of decision-making adults in the household, the propensity to have an adult staying home as a homemaker, and the number of potential income sources entering the household. Appendix Figure A1a and A1b demonstrate violations of the parallel trends assumption for both these alternative potential control groups.
There are additional reasons to believe that these groups are not good comparison candidates for married-parent families. First, household bargaining is assumed nonexistent in these households. There is only one adult in the household responsible for decision making, domestic chores, and guiding child development.
In addition, one parent logistically has less time to devote to helping with homework or attending school events so the environments are different. Second, these parents have a higher propensity to be living in poverty or economically stressed situations. And, finally, deviating from the social norm to live as a single parent head of household in a middle income mostly Catholic country directly implies unobserved characteristics of grit, strength, and resolve that most likely deviate from the general case of the average married parent. For all these reasons and because the parallel trend assumption holds, in addition to the fact that Rangel (2006) and Martínez (2013) have used similar comparisons, the primary comparison I use in this analysis is married parent compared to cohabiting parent families.
